Diving in

Since the end of World War II, wars have been fewer and less lethal. The rise of international institutions, like the United Nations, has created platforms for negotiation, cooperation, and legislation that transcend borders. There exists an international judicial system with laws and norms like any domestic judiciary. While we often hear news about violations of interstate treaties, the fact is multilateral treaties are abided by the vast majority of the time. Seemingly, if we accept even the most minimal moral philosophies, the world is more ethical than it has ever been. States appear to concern themselves with morality and human rights. Provided the current trends of peace continue, it seems that, internationally, humans are making some progress in the realm of morality. International affairs theory begins with the assumption of anarchy: there is no sovereign that can command the behavior of nation-states. “Anarchy” does not indicate a state of chaos and disorder, yet it qualifies as a Hobbesian “state of nature.” The life of a state actor is not "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short," as Hobbes proposes, but tends to be relatively peaceful and long-lasting. Given the current trends, moral progress must be attainable in a state of nature. But to what extent is progress possible? It is impossible to define morality amongst citizens within one state. How can we construct morality amongst hundreds of states in a world with eight billion people?

Within international institutions, nation-states are conveyed certain rights. As with individuals, the most essential right of states is self-determination. The territorial and political sovereignty of states, according to the most basic international law, is fundamentally unassailable. Sovereignty is the cornerstone of all international affairs theory and will be the foundation of my philosophical discussion. If moral progress is indeed possible, it must be in regard to sovereignty. ‘Moral’ states can uphold a moral code only by violating the sovereignty of ‘immoral’ states, making sovereignty not only a political concern but a moral one as well. By giving a state sovereignty, we allow it to behave without physical consequence by legally protecting it from all other states. This makes sovereignty a “moral apparatus” of institutions like the UN: it provides protection from the morals of other states and implicit permission for a state to follow its own moral code. Only by wielding the right to sovereignty can we impact the ethical behavior of states. If we are to progress ethics in international affairs, three questions regarding sovereignty must be answered:

(i) Who is the rightful bearer of sovereignty? In other words, who/what is a state? Is it the people within a territory or a particular government that claims legitimacy?

(ii) If a state does have the right to bear sovereignty, by what virtues does it have this right? Locke suggests that a state may only bear this right if it protects the “natural rights” of citizens and has their “consent.”

(iii) In what circumstances does a state lose its right to sovereignty? In other words, when is interventionism by other actors acceptable?

My answer to each of these questions will constitute the rest of this essay.

Charting a Course: (i) What is a “state”?

To answer (i), I tend to align myself with Hobbes and Mill: a state that effectively holds sovereignty within its borders can claim statehood. Due to the simple fact that states’ foreign policy can differ from that of the citizenry, we must accept that states cannot be treated as majoritarian entities. By definition, states represent the people in their territory and act on their behalf. Regardless of how a government comes to power or how it treats its citizens, any actor with de facto legitimacy must be considered a de jure state. What do we do when two entities with enormous power claim the same territory? Which actor has rightful statehood? Numerous examples immediately come to mind: Taiwan, Palestine, and Northern Cyprus being a few. A declaration of independence alone does not construct a state. Only through a monopoly on power can statehood exist. The classical or Montevideo criteria for statehood is an actor’s monopoly on a “coercive apparatus for power.” This echos numerous “realist” political philosophers: Machiavelli, Rousseau, Kant, Hume, Hegel, Hobbes, Locke, and Weber, to name a few. According to their ‘declaratory theory of recognition,’ states are self- contained and self-constituted entities. States are simply assumed to exist, and their existence demands no moral deliberations. As long as an agent can perpetuate functioning government and domestic order, that agent may lay claim to statehood.

When neither actor has a de facto monopoly on domestic power, I argue that statehood internationally applies to both actors, but bilateral suspension of sovereignty is permissible to resolve a conflict. By definition, a state has failed when two powerful actors exist within a single territory. If neither actor holds a monopoly of power, they cannot exercise enough power to fulfill their minimal duty as a state: control over a population (i.e., “a coercive apparatus for power”). This unique circumstance permits a bilateral suspension of sovereignty: one actor may coerce the other to achieve sovereignty and settle the domestic dispute. While coercion may create a moral issue, statehood is rightfully claimed by both actors internationally but only within the de facto controlled territory. As we have established, mere claims to territory have no bearing on an entity’s statehood.

Imagine two actors, Actor A and Actor B, who both partially control a particular territory. According to my definition, both A and B are considered states within the territory they fully control. However, when it comes to the territory they each partially control, the domestic power apparatus is divided between the two. In this case, the sovereignty of both A and B may be suspended bilaterally. This means that A and B should have the right to engage in attacks against each other without violating international law. Both A and B may attempt to gain complete control over the territory and thus fulfill their minimal duty as a state. However, this dispute does not change the statehood of either on an international level. The conflict between A and B is a domestic one and has no impact on international actors. As far as other states are concerned, A and B should be considered a joint sovereign of the disputed territory.

In the Depths: (ii) Why do states have sovereignty?

I have elucidated my conception of statehood and who may lay claim to such. However, are there any instances in which the right to sovereignty for a state should be withheld? To construct a moral system, we must understand why states are given sovereignty. Political theorist Michael Walzer describes states as “communities of self-determining people.” Indeed, the people within a territory may be coerced into submission by their government. However, Walzer, Hobbes, and Mill argue that simply by existing, a sovereign has the ‘consent’ of its people and thus deserves the right to sovereignty. By this logic, states deserve the right to self- determination (i.e., sovereignty) because individuals have a right to self-determination, and all individuals live under some self-determined social contract. Of course, there are numerous issues with this stance. How can people who live within a state be ‘self-determining’ if the state forcibly quells uprising through the use of extreme threats, force, and propaganda?

Walzer holds a “stern doctrine of self-help.” He believes that people determine their social contract, regardless of circumstances. If there is significant discontent with a social contract, people will naturally rebel against their sovereign. Essentially, Walzer thinks that everyone is responsible for their circumstances. Governments need their citizenry to retain power. Citizens pay taxes, are drafted into the military, and direct the government's attention. When citizens ‘consent’ to a social contract, they will pay taxes, enlist in the military, and stay orderly enough for the government to focus on international issues. When citizens do not consent to their social contract, they will refuse to pay taxes, refuse to enlist in the military, and direct the attention of the government inward.

A government could theoretically harm every rebellious citizen, but by doing so, they will lose significant legitimacy and power. The ‘bargaining model of war, ’ a well-respected international relations theory, suggests that war is less preferable than a peaceful settlement to all actors. War is costly: governments must pay a considerable cost—economic, human, and infrastructural—if they engage in a kinetic conflict with rebels. Thus, it is in the government’s best interest to negotiate a deal with the insurgents to satisfy demands and prevent civil war. Despite the enormous costs rebel movements may pay to get their needs met, the citizens of a state always have tremendous influence over their sovereign. Why would a sovereign compromise its legitimacy and pay the cost of war when a peaceful deal is possible? By this logic, citizens can demand anything from their government— individual rights, new institutions, more freedom, etc.—and get their demands met. This makes sense to me. In some capacity, individuals with free will do indeed construct their own social contract, regardless of circumstances. I agree with Mill’s doctrine and echo the sentiments of other realists: the ‘stern doctrine of self-help’ seems valid, and states deserve sovereignty because their citizens have implicitly consented to their rule.

Many will disagree with this. Already, you may have thought of numerous instances in which egregious acts have been committed against huge populations. Even when a majority of citizens rebel against a government to reform their social contract, the government may crush them due to an imbalance of power. However, in cases like this, the government would indeed pay huge costs and would have been better off negotiating. Rarely are governments tyrannical for the sake of being tyrannical—more often, they want to stay in power or wish to maintain some ideological (i.e., totalitarian) rule.

As far as Hobbes and other realists are concerned, by suppressing rebels, the state is merely fulfilling its duty to maintain order. Again, I largely agree with this statement, though there are some caveats. In order to form a social contract, citizens require certain institutions and public goods. Cases exist where, even if a rebel group tried to form, self- determination would be impossible in any capacity. For example, during the Bengali famine, three million people starved to death due to neglect from the British Indian government. Their deaths were not caused by a food shortage but by “entitlement failure,” by which British India, for economic and political reasons, did not supply their forcibly displaced Bengali population with food. In such cases, it is impossible for any rebellion to form—starving people can barely function, let alone mobilize a rebel movement. In these extreme cases, humanitarian intervention is necessary; states that engage in this kind of oppression cannot retain their right to sovereignty.

However, one can also argue that states that engage in this behavior may be failing states or not even qualify as states at all. Recall the criteria for a state: an actor that holds a sovereign “coercive apparatus for power”; in other words, a state that can use its institutions to force someone to do an act they would not otherwise do. It is hard to argue that a state (e.g., British India) could effectively coerce a starving or otherwise egregiously oppressed group (e.g., Bengalis) to do its bidding. States require thousands of officers to operate institutions, keep order, and protect the state from external threats. Even the most tyrannical of actors would be challenged in maintaining any power apparatus amongst a group of people that can barely sustain their livelihoods. For instance, China under Mao and the USSR under Stalin could be seen as failed or failing states.

But what happens when the state’s institutions are so strong that it can commit inhuman acts of cruelty using an expansive network of loyal officers? For example, the institution of slavery can effectively coerce people to perform actions for a state while also being an egregious violation of human dignity. Or take the Holocaust, the most abominable genocide in human history, which developed a robust network of strong institutions for the sole purpose of coercion. Japan, during WW2, trafficked hundreds of thousands of women using institutional sex slavery. Slave-trading states, Germany, and Japan all successfully maintained a coercive apparatus of power, making them legitimate states. Yet, I would be a lunatic to suggest that these states had any valid right to sovereignty. Walzer agrees.

Floating Adrift: (iii) When is interventionism acceptable?

This is where my argument can no longer be formulaic. Similarly, Walzer, Hobbes, and Mill fail to construct quantitative or qualitative criteria for when sovereignty should not apply in extreme cases. Walzer fails to use philosophical arguments, grasping vague ideas and making tautological assertions. In many ways, the realist argument for moral interventionism is similar to the legal standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt”: a state loses its right to sovereignty only when it does something so egregious that not just one state but the entire international community decides the state should no longer exist. Walzer considers this “humanitarian intervention,” which can only be used to prevent massacre or forced resettlement of an entire people.

While realists provide no reasons for the immorality of these acts, there are many moral arguments against interventionism. Foremost, interventionism may deny an oppressed population the political institutions and capabilities it will need to govern itself once the conflict ends. Intervening states may destroy or take hold of the same power apparatus necessary for the state’s survival rather than handing the power apparatus over to the rebels. As Walzer describes, this type of interventionism is “self-defeating.” Further, foreign intervention may unleash intervention by other states, leading to a destructive war compromising world peace and civilization. Also, foreign states may not correctly identify which actor represents “popular social forces” with correct moral intentions, which may inadvertently advance the interests of bad actors. Finally, foreign intervention usually occurs to advance the interests of the foreign state, not to advance the interests of affected citizens. These reasons suggest that regardless of the tyranny of rule or the suppression of individual rights, intervention by other states is almost always morally wrong.

Finding Ground: Is moral progress possible?

I have painted a bleak picture of international ethics. At face value, it appears as though I reject any progression of ethical conduct by states. After all, the best instrument we have to force ethical conduct—states’ right to sovereignty— should not be wielded. In the same way I reject the use of sovereignty as a moral apparatus, I reject the use of economic compulsion in most cases on similar grounds. I believe states should prioritize sovereignty and state interest over ethics and ideology. More prudent behavior will lead to less war overall, so I think my argument stands on moral grounds. Countries vary so drastically in moral codes—religion, ideology, geography, history, and culture all play a guiding role in states’ morality. Unfortunately, there is no way to reconcile the moral differences between states. The apparent progression in morality that I outlined at the beginning is likely a product of material developments; prominently, nuclear weapons and the threat of mutually assured destruction have led to more fear— and more peace—amongst nations.

However, I do believe that some positive moral changes are taking place. States indeed have what Nietzsche calls a “will to power, ” but their behavior is constrained. This is because there have been drastic normative changes in the international system. The rise of institutions has led to more norms that states follow, not for any moral reason, but because violating the norms would be “inappropriate. ” Just as individuals have norms shaped by social pressures that limit our behavior, states too have norms. More than any international law, these unwritten and unspoken norms have made states more concerned with their reputation, honesty, and ethical behavior.

Before drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, philosopher Jacques Maritain wrote, "We agree on these rights on the condition that no one asks us why." Ultimately, where ethical norms come from doesn’t really matter. A simple, factual observation of the need for principles is sufficient. It is impossible to know how norms develop, but it certainly relates to our global interconnectedness and human nature. Even though states should not shape human ethics, individuals should. Individuals can dutifully pressure their sovereigns, fulfilling their responsibility of self-determination. While movements shouldn’t receive international assistance, citizens alone have enough power to shape their state’s behavior. Accordingly, the behavior of international actors will change. A ‘global conscience’ will emerge and shape the behavior of individuals and states alike. The Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs says it best:

How will we know when new norms might be making a difference? Meaningful normative shifts toward accepting a global ethic will shape personal identity. Individuals in even the most remote locations will begin to see themselves as part of a global economy, a global climate, and a global information system. Values and priorities will evolve to take into account global-level concerns. Zero-sum thinking will begin to give way in some circumstances. Political and social arrangements will evolve. More and more, systems and structures will be designed to align with global expectations while preserving local autonomy and flavor. Done well, ethics and international affairs in the 21st century would inspire, not legislate; it would offer insight not rules and regulations. Its goal would not be to make everyone the same or impose consensus. It would be, rather, to preserve liberty and diversity by recognizing a new reality and norms that must come along with it. A moral world is not the same as a world in which everyone acts with perfect ethical result. This is not possible. However, it is possible to have a world in which the idea of morality is central to decision making. If we can create a world where pluralism, responsibility, and fairness are taken seriously, then the study of ethics and international affairs may indeed be a useful and practical art.

Bibliography

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Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. 5th ed. 1977. Reprint, New York: Basic Books, 2015.

Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, www.carnegiecouncil.org. “Ethics and International Affairs: A Primer,” n.d. https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/explore- engage/classroom-resources/ethics-101/eiaprimer.

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